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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jean Antoine Denis petitions for review of the 
determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
that his conviction for tampering with physical evidence 
under New York law constituted an aggravated felony and a 
particularly serious crime, subjecting him to removal pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and rendering him ineligible 
for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  
Denis also contends that he received ineffective assistance of 
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counsel and should have been found eligible for deferral of 
removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 208.17.1 
 
We conclude that the BIA correctly determined that 
Denis’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony and a 
particularly serious crime, and that Denis is ineligible for 
deferral of removal. 
Background & Procedural History 
  
Denis, a native and citizen of Haiti, entered the United 
States unlawfully in 1985, and adjusted his status to lawful 
permanent resident in 1992.  Prior to emigrating from Haiti, 
Denis was a police officer under Francois Duvalier’s regime, 
and served on the security detail for Duvalier’s motorcades, 
which were widely televised and photographed in Haiti.  
Denis asserts that after he objected to the human rights abuses 
perpetrated by others in Duvalier’s police force, he was 
forced to flee Haiti due to concerns for his safety.  After 
                                              
1Denis petitions for review of four orders issued by the 
BIA: (1) a September 17, 2007 decision reissuing the BIA’s 
August 8, 2005 summary affirmance of the IJ’s denial of 
deferral of removal under the CAT and order of removal; (2) 
a November 13, 2007 decision upholding the IJ’s finding of 
removability and denial of CAT protection, but granting and 
remanding for adjudication Denis’s withholding of removal 
application; (3) a March 18, 2009 decision affirming the 
BIA’s November 13, 2007 aggravated felony finding and 
upholding the denial of withholding of removal and CAT 
protection; and (4) a July 29, 2009 decision denying Denis’s 
motion to reconsider the BIA’s March 18, 2009 decision.   
3 
 
arriving in the United States, Denis continued to support the 
democratic movement in Haiti associated with Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide.  
 
 In the United States, Denis eventually started 
and owned a business that provided a variety of services, 
including selling insurance, notarizing documents, and 
preparing income tax returns.  On November 9, 1998, Denis 
had an altercation with a female client regarding an allegedly 
outstanding debt of $300 owed by Denis to the client.  The 
client visited Denis at his office, bit him and placed him in a 
chokehold; when Denis resisted, the client slipped, landed on 
her head, and died instantly.  Denis panicked and hid the body 
with the assistance of an associate.  
 
Because the victim’s body was stiff and her legs did 
not fit in the bag Denis intended to use to carry the victim to 
his car, Denis dismembered her legs and one of her arms with 
a machete from his office.  After transporting the body in the 
trunk of his car to his house, Denis took the body to the 
basement and left the victim there for approximately two 
days.  He then returned to his office and cleaned up the 
victim’s blood.  Subsequently, Denis and his associate dug 
through the cement floor of Denis’s garage, placed the body 
in a suitcase in the hole, covered the suitcase with dirt, and 
poured cement over the buried corpse. 
 
 Denis’s associate eventually revealed the 
occurrence of the crime, and the police arrested Denis on 
December 15, 1998, charging him with second degree murder 
and tampering with physical evidence.  On June 29, 1999, a 
jury found Denis guilty of second degree manslaughter, in 
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violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 125.15(1),2 
and of tampering with physical evidence, in violation of 
NYPL § 215.40(2).3  Due to the significant aggravating facts 
associated with the aftermath of the fatal attack, the judge 
sentenced Denis to the “absolute maximum sentence for his 
conduct.”  (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 1170.)  Denis 
received an indeterminate sentence of two-and-two-thirds 
years to eight years for manslaughter, and an indeterminate 
sentence of one-and-one-third years to four years for the 
tampering with physical evidence conviction.  Denis served a 
total of seven years in prison and was released in December 
2006.  He was then placed in federal immigration detention 
and placed on supervised released in April 2010. 
 
In June 2004, while Denis was incarcerated for the 
state convictions, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) issued a Notice to Appear to Denis, 
charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his conviction for an aggravated 
                                              
2Section 125.15(1) provides in pertinent part that “[a] 
person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . 
. [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person . . . .”  
N.Y. Penal Law §125.15 (McKinney 2009). 
 
3Section 215.40(2) provides: “Believing that certain 
physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an 
official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and 
intending to prevent such production or use, he suppresses it 
by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction, or by 
employing force, intimidation or deception against any 
person.”   N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40(2) (McKinney 2009). 
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felony,4 as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), namely, an 
offense relating to obstruction of justice for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year.5  Denis appeared with his 
accredited representative before the immigration judge (“IJ”) 
on November 30, 2004, admitted the truth of the factual 
allegations, but denied removability.  He offered testimony as 
to the circumstances of the crime, explaining that he could not 
“just throw [the victim’s] body in the water or somewhere” 
because his fingerprints were on the body.  (A.R. at 782-84.)  
Specifically, Denis worried that he “might have a problem 
with the police if they found [the body],” and decided to 
transport it from his office in Brooklyn, New York to his 
house in Queens, New York.  At a continued hearing on 
February 23, 2005, Denis moved for withholding of removal 
and CAT protection, arguing that he would face persecution if 
he returned to Haiti due to his previous role as a bodyguard to 
the Duvalier regime.  The IJ sustained the aggravated felony 
ground of removability and denied Denis’s request for CAT 
withholding of removal on April 26, 2005.  After a timely 
appeal, the BIA affirmed without opinion the IJ’s decision on 
August 8, 2005.  Denis timely petitioned for review before 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on 
                                              
4Denis was not charged with removability for his 
manslaughter conviction, and we do not consider that 
conviction in this appeal. 
 
5ICE further charged Denis with removability pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), as an alien convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years 
after admission for which a sentence of one year or longer 
may be imposed. ICE subsequently withdrew this charge, and 
it does not factor in our analysis. 
6 
 
October 17, 2007, which petition was transferred to this Court 
on February 18, 2010.6 
 
In extensive subsequent proceedings, Denis challenged 
the IJ’s and BIA’s rulings holding that Denis’s crime of 
conviction constituted an aggravated felony and a particularly 
serious crime; he further disputed the decision as to his 
ineligibility for CAT relief.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision that Denis committed an aggravated felony and the 
IJ’s subsequent decision finding that Denis’s felony 
constituted a particularly serious crime.  The BIA also 
affirmed the IJ’s determination that in spite of receiving 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the deficiency did not 
prejudice Denis as he failed to demonstrate eligibility for 
CAT relief.7  Denis petitioned this Court for review of both of 
                                              
6Denis’s proceedings were originally held in Batavia, 
New York in light of his incarceration in Fishkill, New York.  
Upon completion of his criminal sentence, his proceedings 
were transferred to the immigration court in York, 
Pennsylvania subsequent to his custodial transfer to York 
County Prison. 
 
7After the BIA remanded his case to the IJ, Denis filed 
a motion on December 17, 2007 with the BIA to reopen 
proceedings based on the allegedly ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to object to the initial IJ’s misapplication of 
an incorrect legal standard to Denis’s application for relief 
under the CAT.  The BIA forwarded the motion to reopen to 
the IJ to be considered in tandem with its November 13, 2007 
remand order. The IJ agreed with Denis that his counsel had 
been ineffective, and permitted Denis to augment the record 
as to his CAT claim and granted a new hearing as to whether 
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the BIA’s latter decisions, and the Court consolidated the 
petitions for review. 
 
 In this petition for review, Denis contends that 
his crime of conviction is not an aggravated felony and 
should not constitute a particularly serious crime; he further 
alleges that based on his counsel’s ineffective assistance, he 
was found ineligible for CAT relief without due process.   
Each assertion implicates “constitutional claims or questions 
of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we review the BIA’s 
legal determinations de novo, subject to Chevron principles of 
deference.  Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Chevron, 567 U.S. at 844); Kang v. Att’y Gen., 
611 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  We will address each 
argument in turn.8 
 
                                                                                                     
Denis’s present medical condition would likely lead to his 
torture as a deportee. Denis contended that upon deportation, 
he would lose access to his medicine and become 
symptomatic for hyperthyroidism and hypertension, which 
would render him mentally ill and more likely to be 
intentionally mistreated.  Following the merits hearing on 
October 9, 2008, the IJ denied Denis’s CAT application as 
insufficient.  Denis appealed the decision to the BIA, which 
affirmed the decision on March 18, 2009, and denied Denis’s 
subsequent motion to reconsider. Denis subsequently 
petitioned this Court for review. 
 
8The BIA exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, and had jurisdiction over 
Denis’s motion to reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).  We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).   
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Discussion 
 
I. “Aggravated Felony” Determination Pursuant to 
8  U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) 
 
 Denis contends that his conviction for 
tampering with physical evidence under NYPL § 215.40(2) 
does not constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).  The Attorney General counters that 
Denis’s state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony 
because it was an offense relating to obstruction of justice, 
warranting his removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”), an aggravated felony is defined to include “an 
offense relating to obstruction of justice . . . for which the 
term of imprisonment is at least one year.”  § 1101(a)(43)(S).  
Because Denis’s minimum term of imprisonment exceeded 
one year, his violation of NYPL § 215.40(2) qualifies as an 
aggravated felony and renders him removable if his crime of 
conviction “relat[es] to obstruction of justice.” 
 
Our analysis as to whether a particular state conviction 
constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA usually 
follows the “formal categorical approach” set forth in Taylor 
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); that is, we “look to the 
elements of the statutory state offense, not to the specific 
facts, reading the applicable statute to ascertain the least 
culpable conduct necessary to sustain conviction under the 
statute.”  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 
2009) (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 
2004)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Restrepo v. 
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
categorical approach prohibits consideration of evidence 
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other than the statutory definition of the offense, thus 
precluding review of the particular facts underlying a 
conviction.”).  If the elements of the aggravated felony 
generic crimes enumerated in the federal statute are the same 
as or broader than the elements of the specific criminal statute 
of conviction, then the specific crime of conviction 
categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony.  See, e.g., 
Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
Where, however, “‘a statute criminalizes different 
kinds of conduct, some of which would constitute [aggravated 
felonies] while others would not, the court must apply a 
modified categorical approach by which a court may look 
beyond the statutory elements to determine the particular part 
of the statute under which the defendant was actually 
convicted.’”  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 791 (quoting United 
States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2010)).  In such 
instances, “we have conducted a limited factual inquiry, 
examining the record of conviction for the narrow purpose of 
determining the specific [elements] under which the 
defendant was convicted.”  Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 
(referencing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir. 
2004)).    
 
 Here, we will employ the categorical approach 
in order to determine whether Denis’s crime of conviction 
qualifies as an aggravated felony under the INA.  The 
elements of the state and federal offenses – and not the 
individual facts or circumstances – are determinative to our 
analysis.  Denis argues that, in applying the categorical 
approach, the elements that need to be proven for his 
conviction under NYPL § 215.40(2) do not “match” those of 
the comparable federal crime because the latter is limited to 
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interference with judicial proceedings, while one can be 
convicted under the New York statute for interfering or 
believing to interfere with a broader range of “official” 
proceedings.  However, unlike other subsections of 
§ 1101(a)(43) that define “aggravated felony” by equating a 
crime of conviction with a particular federal generic crime 
element by element – such as 26 U.S.C. § 5861(firearms 
offenses), 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (child pornography), or 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7201 (tax evasion) – subsection (S) of § 1101(a)(43) is 
more descriptive in nature and, thus, slightly more expansive.  
The statutory text states that aggravated felonies include any 
offense “relating to obstruction of justice.”  As such, rather 
than ascertaining whether the elements of a state crime of 
conviction match the elements of a generic federal offense 
with precision, we must only decide that the state conviction 
“relates to” the offense criminalized by § 1101(a)(43)(S), 
namely, obstruction of justice.  Thus, the fact that the 
elements do not precisely “match” each other is not 
determinative. 
 
 The meaning of the phrase “relating to 
obstruction of justice” and its application here present issues 
of first impression in our Court.  The BIA, however, has 
issued a precedential decision analyzing this phrase, In re 
Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999).  There, 
the Board determined that the federal crime of misprision of 
felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4, did not constitute an aggravated felony, 
as it did not sufficiently “relate to”9 obstruction of justice.  Id. 
at 894.  The BIA set forth a specific analytic path to be used 
in determining whether an offense relates to obstruction of 
                                              
9We use the terms “relating to” and “relate to” 
interchangeably throughout this Opinion. 
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justice; namely, the crime of conviction must contain a 
“critical element” – “an affirmative and intentional attempt, 
motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of 
justice.”  Id.  
 
 The threshold issue we must address is the 
appropriate level of deference we should give to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the phrase “relating to obstruction of 
justice,” which requires the presence of this critical element 
in the crime of conviction.  The general question of the 
deference we owe to an agency’s – and specifically to the 
BIA’s – statutory construction of the relevant provision is a 
matter of some confusion.  See, e.g., Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 
F.3d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that Chevron deference 
to administrative interpretation of statute yields to de novo 
review of “legal issues that turn on a pure question of law not 
implicating the agency’s expertise,” but declining to state 
whether deference should be afforded to BIA’s interpretation 
of “aggravated felon”); Drakes v. Zmiski, 240 F.3d 246, 250-
51 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that BIA’s definition of “relating to 
. . . forgery” under § 1101(a)(43)(R) constituted a question of 
law, and fell “somewhere between” the deference owed under 
Chevron and “a pure question of statutory construction for the 
courts to decide”) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 
415, 424 (1999), and Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  See also Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 
1326-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (Farris, J., dissenting) (highlighting 
disagreement as to appropriate level of deference owed to 
BIA’s interpretation of “relating to” in INA).   
 
On the one hand, support is easily found for the 
proposition that we are to engage in de novo review of 
aggravated felony determinations.  See, e.g., Henry v. Bureau 
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of Immig. & Customs Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303, 306 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (exercising plenary review and noting that “[w]e 
do not defer to the BIA’s determination of whether a crime 
constitutes an aggravated felony”); Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 
F.3d 213, 217 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Although we give Chevron 
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the aggravated felony 
provisions of the INA if we determine that the statute is 
ambiguous, the BIA is not entitled to Chevron deference as to 
whether a particular federal criminal offense is an aggravated 
felony.”) (internal citation omitted); Yong Wong Park v. Att’y 
Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[N]either the Attorney 
General nor the BIA . . . ‘is entitled to Chevron deference as 
to whether a particular federal offense is an aggravated 
felony.’”) (citation omitted).  De novo review is customary 
where the issue is one that dictates our subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(c), and is a 
legal issue as to removability.  See Patel, 294 F.3d at 467; Lee 
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2004)  (“We apply 
de novo review to this purely legal question of statutory 
interpretation [of aggravated felony under § 
1101(a)(43)(M)(i)] that governs our own jurisdiction.”); 
Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Because we are determining a purely legal question, and 
one that governs our own jurisdiction, we review de novo 
whether the petitioner’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated 
felony.”); Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 872 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[B]oth our jurisdiction . . . and the merits of the 
appeal turn on the question of whether [the petitioner] is an 
aggravated felon, a decision we review de novo.”).   
 
Furthermore, if the issue turns on the meaning of a 
federal statute other than the INA, we possess the requisite 
expertise to interpret a federal criminal statute such that no 
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deference is due.  See Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 467 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“The interpretation of criminal statutes is a 
task outside the BIA’s special competence and congressional 
delegation, while it is very much a part of this Court’s 
competence.”) (citation omitted); Yong Wong Park, 472 F.3d 
at 71 (“[T]he Attorney General has no particular expertise in 
defining a term under federal law, yet it is ‘what federal 
courts do all the time.’”) (quoting Drakes, 240 F.3d at 251). 
 
On the other hand, we have also recognized that in 
certain instances some deference to the agency’s view as to 
what constitutes an aggravated felony is warranted.  We have 
stated that if we cannot ascertain on our own the meaning of a 
statutory phrase by its plain terms, statutory context, or by 
resort to legislative history, we will defer to the agency’s 
view.  See, e.g., Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 794-95 
(3d Cir. 2010) (observing that the phrase “sexual abuse of a 
minor” in § 1101(a)(43)(A) “is most assuredly not clear and 
unambiguous,” and “leaves us in a state of interpretative 
uncertainty,” warranting deference to the BIA’s reasonable 
interpretation of the phrase); Valansi, 278 F.3d at 208 
(“Despite our exercise of de novo review, we will give 
deference to the agency’s interpretation of the aggravated 
felony definition if Congress’s intent is unclear.”).  This will 
occur if there is a lack of clarity, or outright ambiguity, or if 
the agency has “filled a gap” in the statute.  See Augustin v. 
Att’y Gen., 520 F.3d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (“When 
Congress has left a gap in a statute, implicitly leaving the 
administering agency responsible for filling that gap, ‘a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.’”) (citation omitted).  Moreover, 
where the statutory provision implicates the agency’s concern 
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with foreign relations and diplomatic repercussions, the 
Supreme Court has instructed that the BIA, and not the 
courts, should resolve any ambiguity.  Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 
422; Patel, 294 F.3d at 467-68 (“[J]udicial deference to the 
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration 
context where officials exercise especially sensitive political 
functions.”). 
 
The instant petition for review does not present an 
obscure ambiguity or a matter committed to agency 
discretion.  Rather, the phrase “relating to obstruction of 
justice” in Section 1101(a)(43)(S) includes two discrete 
phrases – “relating to” and “obstruction of justice” – both of 
which are capable of definition.  As to the latter, Title 18 of 
the U.S. Code contains a listing of crimes entitled 
“obstruction of justice,” permitting us to easily determine the 
types of conduct Congress intended the phrase to encompass.  
We noted in Tran that construction of the criminal provisions 
in Title 18 “is a task outside the BIA’s special competence 
and congressional delegation, while it is very much a part of 
this Court’s competence.”  414 F.3d at 467 (citing Francis v. 
Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Similarly, we have 
often discussed the meaning of the phrase “relating to” in 
Section 1101(a)(43), observing that the phrase is to be read 
expansively and “must not be strictly confined to its 
narrowest meaning.”  Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249; see also Yong 
Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 72 (finding Congress’s use of 
“relating to” “critical,” “evidenc[ing] an intent to define [the 
listed offenses] in [their] broadest sense”).10   Indeed, unless 
                                              
10The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise 
explained that Congress’s use of “relating to” in subsection 
(R) “necessarily” signaled an intent to cover “a range of 
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the words “relating to” are of no effect, they must be 
construed to encompass crimes other than those specifically 
listed in the federal statutes.  See Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 
F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing that the Supreme 
Court previously rejected a narrow construction of the phrase, 
and defined “relating to” as follows: “to stand in some 
relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring 
into association with or connection with”) (quoting Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)); see 
generally United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 62-63 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[L]egislative enactments should not be construed to 
render their provisions mere surplusage.”).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that our review here is de novo and we owe no 
deference to the BIA’s reasoning or definition.11 
                                                                                                     
activities beyond those of counterfeiting or forgery itself.”  
Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 
11Notably, the Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals followed a deferential approach in applying the 
statutory provision before us, examining whether the Board’s 
reasoning – as set forth in Espinoza – resulted in a 
permissible construction of the language of the INA under 
Chevron.  See Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 
1086 (9th Cir. 2008); Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 
857, 861 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 
620 F.3d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2010); Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 
F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2004).  Relying on Aguirre, both 
courts concluded that the phrase “offense relating to 
obstruction of justice” lacked a clear meaning, and therefore 
deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of subsection (S).  In 
Aguirre, however, the phrase at issue – “serious nonpolitical 
crime” – was viewed by the Supreme Court as pertaining to 
16 
 
 
Although we do not defer to the BIA here, we will 
discuss its approach to resolving the instant matter, as it bears 
some similarities to our own.  Relying on its previous 
precedential decision in Espinoza, the BIA concluded that the 
elements of Denis’s offense of conviction required “an 
affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific 
intent to, interfere with the process of justice.”  (J.A.-12.)  As 
this element was present in the New York crime, Denis was 
found to be an aggravated felon, and removable by virtue of 
Section 1227(a)(2). 
 
In Espinoza, the BIA decided that misprision of felony 
did not constitute a crime “relating to” obstruction of justice.  
22 I. & N. Dec. at 892.  The Board explored the elements of 
misprision and compared them to the elements of the federal 
offenses included in the list of crimes labeled “obstruction of 
justice” in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518.  22 I. & N. Dec. at 892.  
The BIA found Section 1503 inapplicable to misprision of a 
felony since it does not “require as an element either active 
                                                                                                     
the Executive Branch’s exercise of “especially sensitive 
political functions that implicate questions of foreign 
relations.”  526 U.S. at 422.  In contrast, here, the phrase 
“relating to obstruction of justice” bears none of the same 
implications.  See Yong Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 70 
(observing that Aguirre’s foreign policy considerations 
“motivating that deference are largely absent” in the § 
1101(a)(43) context).  More importantly, the instant phrase is 
readily definable, unlike “serious nonpolitical crime.”  As we 
already noted, we are well-equipped to interpret and apply the 
statutory language of Title 18 on our own, and will not defer 
to the Board’s view. 
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interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or 
action or threat of action against those who would cooperate 
in the process of justice.”  Id.  The BIA reasoned that 
“Congress did not adopt a generic descriptive phrase such as 
‘obstructing justice’ or ‘obstruct justice,’ but chose instead a 
term of art utilized in the United States Code to designate a 
specific list of crimes.”  Id. at 893.  Noting that the United 
States Code “delineates a circumscribed set of offenses that 
constitute ‘obstruction of justice,’” the agency articulated its 
belief that not “every offense that, by its nature, would tend to 
‘obstruct justice’ is an offense that should properly be 
classified as ‘obstruction of justice.’”  Id. at 893-94.  “To 
include all offenses that have a tendency to, or by their nature 
do, obstruct justice would cast the net too widely.”  Id. 
 
The BIA focused on “the nature of the underlying 
offense,” namely, misprision of felony, and concluded that 
the conviction for misprision did not relate to obstruction of 
justice because it was “separate and distinct from the crimes 
[actually] categorized as ‘obstruction of justice.’”  Id. at 896.  
Indeed, misprision of felony and obstruction of justice are 
treated as separate offenses under federal law.  Id. at 894.  
Importantly, the Board also noted that misprision lacked the 
“critical element” of an obstruction of justice offense – “an 
affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific 
intent, to interfere with the process of justice.”  Id. at 894.   
 
While we do consider the elements of a crime in 
deciding whether a conviction is “related to” another offense, 
see, e.g., Drakes, 240 F.3d at 250 (examining distinct 
elements of forgery crimes in several jurisdictions for 
purposes of Section 1101(a)(43)(R) determination), we have 
also held that the crimes of conviction can be “related to” a 
18 
 
listed offense without containing what might be viewed as an 
essential element.  In Bobb, we addressed whether a 
conviction for forging a check in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 510(a)(2) constituted an offense “related to” forgery under 
Section 1101(a)(43)(R).  458 F.3d at 219-20.  We stated that 
Congress intended to define forgery in its broadest sense by 
using the language “relating to”: 
 
The term “relate” means “to show or 
establish a logical or causal connection 
between.”  Subsection (R) thus encompasses 
conduct beyond the traditional definition of 
forgery, and includes criminal conduct that is 
causally connected to forgery, but may lack as 
an essential element an intent to defraud or 
deceive. 
458 F.3d at 219.  We remarked that the example of 
Section 510(b), which criminalizes the knowing exchange of 
stolen or forged Treasury instruments, represented a good 
example of an offense “related to” forgery, even though it 
lacked as an element an intent to defraud or deceive.  Id. 
(“[I]f [Congress] had used the language ‘forgery offense’ 
instead of ‘related to . . . forgery’ – then [the narrow 
interpretation] would have merit.”); see also Drakes, 240 F.3d 
at 250 (holding that forgery lacking an intent to defraud still 
“related to . . . forgery” under subsection (R)).  
 
Similarly, in Yong Wong Park, we considered whether 
a conviction for trafficking in counterfeit items constituted an 
aggravated felony “relating to . . . counterfeiting” pursuant to 
subsection (R).  472 F.3d at 72.  Finding the distinction 
between “counterfeiting” and “relating to . . . counterfeiting” 
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“critical,” we opined that “considering the broad reach of the 
term ‘relating to,’ certainly a statute which prohibits the 
knowing use of a counterfeit mark is a statute which codifies 
an offense relating to counterfeiting.”  Id. (“Indeed, it is 
common for a federal criminal statute pertaining to 
counterfeiting to include as an element of the crime either the 
act of counterfeiting or the knowing use of the end product of 
an act of counterfeiting.”).  We concluded that the specific 
statute of conviction “was simply one of several federal 
criminal statutes which ‘seeks to discourage [the act of] 
counterfeiting through the criminalization of the use of its end 
product.’”  Id. (quoting Albillo-Figueroa, 221 F.3d at 1073). 
 
Accordingly, our caselaw would seem to embrace a 
broader reading of “related to” obstruction of justice than that 
adopted by the BIA, which required the presence of a “critical 
element.”  To give effect to Congress’s choice of language, a 
categorical matching of the elements of the offense of 
conviction with the elements of a federal law cannot be the 
sole test for determining whether a crime of conviction 
“relates to” a generic federal offense.12  Indeed, we 
                                              
12In this regard, we again depart from the view adopted 
by the Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals, which have 
read Espinoza to suggest that “the question whether a specific 
offense of conviction counts as an aggravated felony under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(S) depends exclusively on whether ‘the 
elements of the offense . . . constitute the crime of obstruction 
of justice as that term is defined’ in” §§ 1501-1521.  Salazar-
Luviano , 551 F.3d at 861 (quoting Espinoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
at 893) (emphasis added); see also Alwan, 388 F.3d at 514 
(finding that substantive offense of conviction categorically 
matched the elements of obstruction of justice under § 1503, 
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previously found that a “causal connection” may suffice to 
make the separate crimes related; the connection between a 
crime of forgery and the exchange of forged documents is a 
prime example.  See Bobb, 458 F.3d at 219-220 (“Congress’ 
choice of the word ‘related to’ was intended to capture certain 
criminal conduct . . . which does not contain any intent to 
deceive or defraud”). 
 
 The parties to this petition focused extensively 
upon the elements of Denis’s crime when compared to the 
crimes enumerated in the obstruction of justice section of 
Title 18.  Each side proposed that deference is due, assuming 
that we would defer to the BIA’s “critical element” approach 
in Espinoza.  We conclude that their reasoning and focus is 
misguided.  We need not determine the precise degree of 
similarity between the elements of Denis’s offense and a 
                                                                                                     
where “the defendant [was] convicted of a crime not 
expressly designated as obstruction”).  Rather than treating 
the provisions in title 18 as merely guiding the analysis of 
whether a crime of conviction relates to obstruction of justice 
under § 1101(a)(43)(S), these decisions instead require that 
the elements of the crime categorically match the elements of 
the individual offenses listed in Section 1501 et seq.  This 
interpretation effectively disregards Congress’s decision to 
employ the expansive term “relating to” in subsection (S) and 
is unsupported by the plain language of the statute.  “Unless 
the words ‘relating to’ have no effect, the enumerated crime . 
. . must not be strictly confined to its narrowest meaning.”  
Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249 (citing Ruiz-Romero v. Reno, 205 
F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that “related to” 
describes a class of crimes and does not constitute a 
restriction)). 
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listed federal crime.  Rather, under our precedent, we will 
“survey the interrelationship between [the] two statutory 
provisions,” Bobb, 458 F.3d at 214, and apply the phrase 
“relating to” broadly, seeking a logical or causal 
connection.13  Here, that task is straightforward and the test is 
easily met. 
                                             
 
 Examining Denis’s crime of conviction in 
relation to the federal obstruction of justice offenses codified 
in Section 1501 et seq., we are convinced that Denis’s 
conviction represented a crime relating to obstruction of 
justice.  The two provisions most relevant to Denis’s conduct 
are Sections 1503 and 1512(c).  (J.A.-12.)  Section 1503 
contains a catchall provision prohibiting a person from 
“corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter 
or communication, influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or 
imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct or impede, 
the due administration of justice.”  18 U.S.C. § 1503.  Both 
 
13Although we need not defer to the BIA’s decision in 
Espinoza, even if we were to find § 1101(a)(43)(S) 
ambiguous and accorded Chevron deference, we would 
nevertheless find the Board’s requirement of the “critical 
element” as the sine qua non of an aggravated felony an 
impermissibly narrow interpretation.  As we stated in Yong 
Wong Park with respect to Section 1101(a)(43)(R), “there 
exist offenses ‘related to’ forgery which do not contain as an 
essential element an intent to defraud or deceive.”  458 F.3d 
at 220.  Similarly here, there may exist offenses causally 
related to obstruction of justice that do not necessarily contain 
“the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt, 
motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of 
justice.”  Espinoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893.   
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Denis’s crime of conviction and this federal obstruction of 
justice provision, by their terms, proscribe any behavior that 
entails the use of force in an effort to impede or obstruct an 
official proceeding,14 such as through evidence tampering.  
See United States v. Jahedi, 681 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that courts consistently construe § 
1503 to cover evidence tampering); see also United States v. 
Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 952 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that 
concealment and destruction of documents satisfies § 1503).  
Thus, Denis’s conviction for tampering bears a close 
resemblance to the federal obstruction of justice offense 
defined in Section 1503.15 
                                              
14Title 18 defines official proceeding as “a proceeding 
before a judge or court of the United States . . . or a Federal 
grand jury . . . or a proceeding before a Federal Government 
agency
enses classified as 
 which is authorized by law.”  18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1). 
 
15As noted above, while Section 215.40(2) has been 
interpreted by New York courts to apply regardless of 
whether the conduct interfered with a judicial proceeding or a 
police investigation, see, e.g. People v. Berdini, 845 N.Y.S.2d 
717, 721 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2007), and Section 1503 only 
pertains to obstruction of judicial proceedings, United States 
v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995), this distinction does not 
defeat our “relating to” analysis, even if it could defeat a 
traditional categorical matching of the crime of conviction 
with a generic federal offense, see Garcia, 462 F.3d at 291.  
As discussed, our approach does not depend upon matching 
the elements of the state crime of conviction with the 
elements of Section 1503, and, instead, we only consider the 
provision to identify the nature of off
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Section 1512 provides similar reinforcement.  This 
obstruction of justice provision prohibits in pertinent part 
alteration, destruction, mutilation, or concealment of any 
object that would “impair the object’s integrity or availability 
for use in an official proceeding.”  18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).16  
This subsection’s focus on destroying or mutilating 
evidentiary items in anticipation of their potential production 
in a prospective proceeding is directly analogous, and thus, 
logically connected to Denis’s state crime of conviction.17  As 
such, Denis’s offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” as 
                                                                                                     
 federal law for purposes of 
conducting the “relating to” examination. 
obstruction of justice under
16In contrast with Section 1503 and its limited 
application to judicial proceedings under Aguilar, Section 
1512(f)(1) specifically notes that “an official proceeding need 
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the 
offense” for subsection (c) to govern a tampering offense.   
 
17We need not resolve Denis’s assertion that the 
current iteration of Section 1512(c) – which added the 
subsection on tampering with physical evidence – constitutes 
an impermissible retroactive application of an amended 
statute under Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 
(1994).  As with our review of Section 1503, we consider the 
amended Section 1512(c) solely to gauge Congress’s 
conception of the scope of offenses that constitute obstruction 
of justice for purposes of deciding which offenses relate to 
the topic under Section 1101(a)(43)(S).  As such, we do not 
actually rely upon 1512(c) to find that Denis’s crime of 
conviction categorically matched the elements of the 
amended section. 
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that offense is defined in both federal statutes – Sections 
1512(c
o review the BIA’s final order of removal 
pursuant to Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a
larly Serious Crime” Determination 
y placed the burden upon 
him to disprove that his offense was particularly serious.  We 
reject 
) and 1503.   
 
Because Denis’s violation of NYPL § 215.40(2) 
relates to obstruction of justice and mandated a term of 
imprisonment of at least one year, it qualifies as an 
aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S).  Accordingly, 
Denis’s petition for review on this basis will be denied as we 
lack jurisdiction t
)(2)(C). 
II. “Particu
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) 
  
Denis next contests the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s 
ruling that Denis committed a “particularly serious crime,” as 
codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and is thus ineligible for 
withholding of removal.  Denis argues that the elements of his 
crime of conviction – as well as the actual underlying conduct 
– did not entail a crime against a person, and should not be 
deemed particularly serious.  Denis also contends that in 
ruling on this issue, the IJ improperly considered evidence of 
alleged offenses of which Denis was acquitted.  Finally, 
Denis argues that the IJ improperl
each of Denis’s contentions. 
 
Section 1231 provides that while the Attorney General 
“may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General 
decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in 
that country,” § 1231(b)(3)(A), such withholding is 
unavailable “if the Attorney General decides that . . . the 
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alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the 
United States,” § 1231(b)(3)(B).  The Section further explains 
that “an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony 
. . . for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate 
term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to 
have committed a particularly serious crime.”  Id.; see also 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).  Here, Denis’s sentence for an 
aggravated felony did not entail a minimum imprisonment of 
at least five years, rendering the conviction not particularly 
serious per se. 
 
Unlike the commonly understood terms discussed 
above concerning the definition of an aggravated felony 
relating to obstruction of justice, there are no textual or 
contextual indicators in the INA as to “how the Board should 
determine whether an alien has committed a ‘particularly 
serious crime’ when a court has convicted the alien of an 
aggravated felony for which the court sentenced the alien to 
less than five years imprisonment.”  Chong v. INS, 264 F.3d 
378, 387 (3d Cir. 2001).  The statute itself expressly grants 
the Attorney General discretion to decide whether an alien 
committed a particularly serious crime; the Attorney General 
may “determin[e] that, notwithstanding the length of sentence 
imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious 
crime.”  Id. (citing § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv)); see also Lapaix v. 
Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010) (“When the 
offense in question is not a per se particularly serious crime, 
the Attorney General retains discretion to determine on a 
case-by-case basis whether the offense constituted a 
particularly serious crime.”); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 
439 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Attorney General may determine 
that any aggravated felony, even one that results in a sentence 
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of less than five years, qualifies as particularly serious.”) 
(emphasis in original).  The statutory language “contains no 
limiting language restricting the Attorney General’s 
discretion to label [ ] crimes as ‘particularly serious’ . . . [and] 
the long history of case-by-case determination of ‘particularly 
serious crimes’ counsels against [attempts] to craft a bright-
line rule.”  N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1076 (10th Cir. 
2009).  As in Aguirre, the provision of the INA here 
anticipates reliance on the expertise of the agency for a 
judgment as to “seriousness,” as given meaning “through a 
process of case-by-case adjudication,” 526 U.S. at 425; the 
application of this phrase is committed to the agency’s 
reasoning and exercise of discretion.  Accordingly, we will 
defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory text if it “is 
based on a permissible construction of § 1231(b)(3)(B).”18  
Chong, 264 F.3d at 387 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43); 
see also Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“We . . . will afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
reasonable interpretations of statutes which it is charged with 
admini
                                             
stering.”).   
 
 
18In reviewing the BIA’s determination of particularly 
serious crime, we reiterate our previous conclusion that the 
statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which limits judicial 
review of the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions,  is 
“insufficient to pull the ‘particularly serious crime’ 
determination out from the broad class of reviewable 
decisions that require the application of law to fact into the 
narrower class of decisions where judicial review is precluded 
by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”  Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 
101-02 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). 
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The BIA has taken a notably expansive view as to 
what can be considered in determining whether a crime 
qualifies as particularly serious.  In Chong, we commented on 
that approach
o 
make this determination, we look to the 
convic
s criminal case or go behind the record 
of conviction to redetermine the alien’s innocence 
36, 342 (BIA 2007).  
Further distancing the analysis from a categorical or 
structured app
 with approval: 
 
[C]onsideration of the individual facts and 
circumstances is appropriate . . . This inquiry 
does not involve an examination of the 
respondents’ family or community ties, or the risk 
of persecution in the alien’s native country.  T
tion records and sentencing information. 
 
Further, we do not engage in a retrial of 
the alien’
or guilt. 
 
264 F.3d at 388 (quoting In re L-S, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
645, 651 (BIA 1999)).  After our decision in Chong, the BIA 
provided more clarity as to the evidence that may be 
considered in deciding whether an offense is particularly 
serious.  In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 3
roach, the BIA explained: 
 
If the elements of the offense do not 
potentially bring the crime into a category of 
particularly serious crimes, the individual facts 
and circumstances of the offense are of no 
consequence, and the alien would not be barred 
from a grant of withholding of removal.  On the 
other hand, once the elements of the offense are 
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examined and found to potentially bring the 
offense within the ambit of a particularly serious 
crime, all reliable information may be considered 
in making a particularly serious crime 
determination, including the conviction records 
and sentencing information, as well as other 
inform tion outside the confines of a record of 
plicable to the inherently discretionary 
determ ation of whether a conviction is for a particularly 
serious
factors as the nature of the conviction, the circumstances of 
a
conviction. 
 
Id. (citing L-S, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 654-56).  In other 
words, where the elements of the crime of conviction suggest 
that the crime could potentially qualify as particularly serious, 
the BIA “[does] not prohibit the examination of other 
evidence or indicate that only conviction records and 
sentencing information could be used.”  Id. at 344.  In fact, 
the BIA emphasized that no decision “has ever suggested that 
the categorical approach, used primarily in determining 
removability, is ap
in
 crime.”  Id. 
 
Although the BIA will sometimes rely “exclusively on 
the elements of an offense” in exercising its discretion, it 
“generally examine[s] a variety of factors” and “see[s] no 
reason to exclude otherwise reliable information from 
consideration . . . once the nature of the crime, as measured 
by its elements, brings it within the range of a ‘particularly 
serious’ offense.”  Id. (citing In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 306 (BIA 2007)); In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 
650-51 (BIA 1996) (applying categorical approach for case-
by-case analysis based solely on the statutory elements of the 
offense).  In such instances, IJs and the BIA “look ‘to such 
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the underlying facts of the conviction, [and] the type of 
sentence imposed.’”19  Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143-44 (quoting 
In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982)); see 
also Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 677-78 (9th Cir. 
2010) (same); Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 
2009) (same). 
                                             
 
Pursuant to the above approach, before examining the 
individual facts and circumstances of a case, the BIA will first 
decide whether the elements of an offense “potentially bring 
the offense within the ambit of a particularly serious crime.”  
N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.  The BIA has consistently 
stated that crimes entailing or threatening to use physical 
force or violence against another person “are more likely to 
be categorized as particularly serious.”  Id.; L-S-, 22 I. & N. 
 
19The BIA previously considered “whether the type 
and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be 
a danger to the community” as the “most important[ ]” factor 
in the instant analysis.  In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 
247.  In N-A-M-, however, the BIA emphasized that its 
“approach to determining whether a crime is particularly 
serious has evolved since the issuance of [its] decision in [ ] 
Frentescu.”  24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.  “Once an alien is found 
to have committed a particularly serious crime, [the BIA] no 
longer engage[s] in a separate determination to address 
whether the alien is a danger to the community.”  Id.  Instead, 
“the proper focus for determining whether a crime is 
particularly serious is on the nature of the crime and not the 
likelihood of future serious misconduct.”  Id. (citations 
omitted); see generally Tian, 576 F.3d at 897 (same).  
Therefore, neither the IJ nor the BIA, nor we, need opine as to 
Denis’s potential danger to the community. 
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Dec. at 649; In re LSJ, 21 I. & N. Dec. 973, 974-75 (BIA 
1997) (finding armed robbery with the threat of violence 
against several people particularly serious).20  Here, Denis 
employs this line of reasoning to urge that because the victim 
was deceased when the tampering occurred, his crime cannot 
constitute a particularly serious crime because it was not 
committed against a person.  This argument is unavailing.   
d other information outside the record of 
conviction”). 
                                             
 
The fact that crimes against persons are considered 
particularly serious does not suggest that other offenses – 
such as the crime of conviction here – cannot also be viewed 
as particularly serious.  To decide, we look, as did the BIA, to 
all reliable evidence “in making a particularly serious crime 
determination.”  N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342; see J.A.-22 
(noting that the IJ properly reviewed “the respondent’s 
testimony an
 
 
20Analogously, our fellow Courts of Appeals regularly 
focus upon the use of force or violence against other persons 
in reviewing BIA decisions defining particularly serious 
crimes.  See, e.g., Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, 951 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (observing that plaintiff can rebut presumption of 
particularly serious crime by establishing “the absence of any 
violence or threat of violence”); Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 
516 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that conviction for 
crime demonstrating propensity for violence is indicative of a 
particularly serious crime); Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 328 
(4th Cir. 2001) (“When the crime is a against a person, the 
likelihood that the offense will be classified as a ‘particularly 
serious crime’ is increased.”); Ikharo v. Holder, 614 F.3d 
622, 633 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). 
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Here, the Board concluded that “in view of the 
gruesome brutality of the respondent’s actions underlying the 
conviction (as graphically reflected in the respondent’s 
testimony), we expressly reject the respondent’s contention 
that the record of proceeding fails to establish” the 
particularly serious nature of his crime.  (J.A.-22.)  We find 
this a permissible reading and application of the phrase.  
Consideration of the “individual facts and circumstances” 
reveals that Denis tampered with physical evidence by 
violently dismembering and concealing his victim.21  
Moreover, the record confirms that Denis perpetrated the 
offense through the use of physical force.  The BIA properly 
considered the nature of his acts and we will not disturb its 
determination that Denis’s offense constituted a particularly 
serious crime.22 
                                              
21See In re Denis, Decision and Order, J.A.-152 
(“[R]espondent, in a grisly and wanton act, grossly disfigured 
his victim’s body by hacking her legs off with a machete, 
took the body to his house when his wife and child were at 
home, and returned to clean up the crime scene.”) 
 
22Denis separately avers that the IJ improperly 
considered evidence of alleged offenses of which Denis was 
acquitted in deciding upon the particularly serious question. 
Citing our decision in Alaka, Denis claims that evidence of 
other bad acts or other convictions may not be considered in 
this analysis, and only evidence of the conviction’s elements 
is appropriate. In so arguing, Denis mischaracterizes Alaka, 
which only provided that dismissed charges may not be 
considered in determining whether an offense was 
particularly serious.  456 F.3d at 108-09 (“[W]e can find no 
authority for the proposition that dismissed counts or crimes . 
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Denis’s final argument as to the IJ’s and BIA’s 
purportedly improper placement of the burden of proof is 
similarly incorrect.  The BIA stated in N-A-M- that “[i]t has 
been our practice to allow both parties to explain and 
introduce evidence as to why a crime is particularly serious or 
not.”  24 I. & N. Dec. at 344.  In this vein, the government 
advanced Denis’s testimony and the record of conviction to 
demonstrate the particularly serious nature of the offense, 
while Denis provided no explanation to rebut this 
conclusion.23  See generally Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 
645, 951 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that plaintiff can rebut 
presumption of particularly serious crime by establishing “the 
absence of any violence or threat of violence”).  On appeal, 
Denis merely stands upon the already rejected assertion that 
his crime did not involve an act “against a person” and thus 
did not bring it within the ambit of a particularly serious 
crime.  We find no fault in this regard and no prejudice to 
                                                                                                     
. . may be considered in determining whether a specific crime 
is a particularly serious crime”) (quoting Yousefi, 260 F.3d at 
329-30).  Our review of the record does not support Denis’s 
allegation that the IJ or the BIA relied on such dismissed 
charges in reaching its decision, and Denis advanced no 
evidence to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, as more 
thoroughly demonstrated in this section, the BIA may 
consider more than the mere elements of an offense in finding 
a conviction particularly serious.  
 
23See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (“If the evidence 
indicates the applicability of one or more of the grounds for 
denial of withholding enumerated in the Act, the applicant 
shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that such grounds do not apply.”). 
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Denis in the IJ’s proper review and consideration of all 
pertinent evidence as permitted by the BIA’s controlling 
precedents.   
thholding of removal pursuant to 
Section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
 
e 
 
As such, we are left with no doubt that the IJ and the 
BIA properly exercised their discretion in applying the legal 
standard to the instant facts in finding Denis’s crime 
particularly serious.  It follows that Denis’s crime of 
conviction constitutes a particularly serious crime, and he is 
therefore ineligible for wi
III.  Deferral of Removal Pursuant to th
Convention Against Torture Determination 
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The final issues on appeal pertain to Denis’s claim of 
entitlement to deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16.  Denis contends that the BIA and the IJ failed to 
provide a full and fair rehearing of his CAT claim after the IJ 
determined that Denis was denied due process as a result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The IJ afforded Denis an 
opportunity to augment the record with further evidence, but 
limited the subsequent merits hearing to evidence of Denis’s 
present medical condition.  Denis also avers that he 
demonstrated eligibility for CAT relief because he will be 
singled out for torture due to his status as a former Duvalier 
regime officer and also due to his dependence upon 
hyperthyroid and hypertension medication, the absence of 
which may render him mentally ill and seemingly 
noncompliant with the prison guards.  We will address these 
argum ts in reverse order. 
 
 the 
likelih e v. 
Attorn ierre 
addres al of 
remov ould 
experi ed to 
a Hait d the 
origins
comm the 
involu  there 
are su  the person would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.”  Id. at 186 (quoting § 
1231 n
en
Our resolution of Denis’s claims regarding
ood of torture is informed by our discussion in Pierr
ey General, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008).  P
sed the petition of a Haitian alien for deferr
al pursuant to the CAT on the basis that the alien w
ence torture, extreme pain, and suffering if deport
ian prison.  Id. at 183-84.  There we discusse
 and policy underlying the CAT, namely a 
itment “not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect 
ntary return of any person to a country in which
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ote)).  Consequently, deferral of removal is mandatory 
if a petitioner is able to show that he is more “likely than not” 
to be tortured.  Id. at 186 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a)).  
35 
 
Pursuant to the Attorney General’s promulgated regulations 
setting forth the procedures by which individuals could seek 
relief under the CAT, an act constitutes torture solely if it is: 
ffering.”  Id. at 190.   
 
intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a 
third person information or a confession, 
punishing him or her for an act he or she or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing 
him or her on a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. 
 
Id. at 189 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)).  In light 
of this definition, we concluded in Pierre that “a petitioner 
cannot obtain relief under the CAT unless he can show that 
his prospective torturer will have the goal or purpose of 
inflicting severe pain or su
 
On the facts, we determined that Pierre would be 
imprisoned “because the Haitian government has a blanket 
policy of imprisoning ex-convicts who are deported to Haiti 
in order to reduce crime.”  Id. at 189; see also Auguste v. 
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 152 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing indefinite 
detention of ex-convicts returned to Haiti).  We further 
observed that “the lack of medical care and likely pain that 
Pierre will experience is an unfortunate but unintended 
consequence of the poor conditions in the Haitian prisons, 
which exist because of Haiti’s extreme poverty.”  Pierre, 528 
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F.3d at 189; see also Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153 (same).  
Because Pierre “failed to show that Haitian officials will have 
the purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering by placing 
him in detention upon his removal from the United States,” 
“this unintended consequence is not the type of proscribed 
purpose contemplated by the CAT.”  Id. at 189, 190; see also 
Gourdet v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he 
substandard prison conditions in Haiti did not constitute 
torture under the CAT.”). 
 
Similarly here, Denis failed to demonstrate that the 
Haitian prison officials will more likely than not specifically 
target him or intend to inflict pain on him because of potential 
symptoms resulting from his hyperthyroid and hypertension 
medical conditions.  His unsupported speculation as to how 
he may appear or act, how the prison officials may potentially 
react, and the purported state of mind of the prison officials 
that may hypothetically inflict pain upon him, does not rise to 
the level of proof necessary to demonstrate that he will more 
likely than not be singled out for torture.  Furthermore, Denis 
failed to substantiate his assertion that he would be singled 
out for torture by Haitian prison officials because of his 
unspecified role as a bodyguard for the Duvalier regime in the 
previous century.  Indeed, Denis’s assertions are “based on a 
chain of assumptions and a fear of what might happen, rather 
than evidence that meets [his] burden of demonstrating that it 
is more likely than not that [he] will be subjected to torture 
by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official . . . .”  In re 
M-B-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479-80 (BIA 2002) (en banc) 
(emphasis in original).  Accordingly, the BIA properly 
applied the standard for CAT and denied Denis’s request for 
deferral of removal. 
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Our conclusion that Denis is ineligible for CAT relief 
informs our resolution of his due process claim.  Although the 
IJ found that Denis’s counsel provided ineffective assistance, 
we previously stated that “an alien claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings must, in 
addition to showing that his lawyer committed unprofessional 
errors, show that there was a ‘reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been different if the error[s] . . . had not 
occurr
tative 
prevented him from introducing evidence that competent 
counsel would have otherwise discovered and marshaled in 
support of the respondent’s claim.”  (J.A. 23.)  Denis did not 
ed.’”  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 
362 (2006)).  In this vein, “to prevail on a procedural due 
process challenge to a decision by the BIA, an alien must 
make an initial showing of substantial prejudice.”  
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citing De Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 
2004)).  Mindful of our focus on substantial prejudice, we 
reasoned that where an alien “cannot demonstrate that he was 
eligible for relief . . . under the CAT, no procedural due 
process claim can lie.”  Id.  
 
Dennis cannot satisfy this standard.  As we already 
decided, he failed to adduce evidence establishing that he 
would more likely than not be singled out for torture.  His 
ineligibility for CAT relief wholly undermines Denis’s 
assertion that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused 
substantial prejudice to his otherwise compelling claim.  On 
this ground alone, his due process claim must fail.   
 
Moreover, the BIA correctly rejected Denis’s assertion 
that “deficient performance of the prior represen
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identify “any specific evidence . . . that his prior 
representative failed to submit in support of the claim that 
would
nce relevant to his medical conditions, and the [IJ] 
imposed no unreasonable limitation on [Denis’s] opportunity 
to submit and develop such evidence.”  (Id.)  Even in the 
absence of an entirely new hearing, Denis was given ample 
opportunity to supplement the record with additional 
allegations pertaining to his claims.  Considering Denis’s 
failure to adduce persuasive particularized evidence and to 
make an initial showing of substantial prejudice from the IJ’s 
decision, the BIA’s reasoning and decision are proper.   
 
As a result, Denis’s claim for relief under the CAT and 
his procedural due process claim for a new hearing fail. 
Conclusion
 have ‘likely changed the outcome of his initial removal 
proceedings.’”  (J.A. 23.)  Indeed, “the only evidence 
particular to [Denis that he] sought to submit in support . . . 
was evide
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we find no constitutional 
violation or legal error in the BIA’s resolution of Denis’s 
arguments.  Accordingly, we will deny the petitions for 
review.  
